Fourth Report of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions by unknown
NASA-TM-II2692 / tv -t_ ---Fi>{
• _7, w- -_ ° ;:
Fourth Report
of the
Task
Force
on
the
Shuttle-Mir
Rendezvous
& [locking
Missions
March 1, 1995
A Task Force of the
NASA Advisory Council
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19970013805 2020-06-16T03:01:25+00:00Z

THOMAS P. STAFFORD
1006 Cameron Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
March 1, 1995
Dr. Bradford Paxkinson
Chairman, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Advisory Council
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Dear Dr. Parkinson:
Enclosed is the fourth report of the NAC Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and
Docking Missions. This report is the culmination of a two and one-half month review of
preparations in Russia for the Phase 1A missions (Soyuz TM-21, Mir 18 Main Expedition,
and STS-71). Once again the Task Force received tremendous support from many individuals
and organizations at NASA. The same applied to our site visits in Russia where we were met
with an openness and candor which served to reinforce our confidence in the ultimate success
of the upcoming missions.
Over the next two months, the Task Force will be focusing its efforts in two areas. The first
are the preparations for STS-71, including the status of the Orbiter Docking System and the
analysis of data produced by the STS-63 mission. The second area is the NASA and NASA
contractor presence in Russia, including the interaction of Phase 1 and Phase 2 personnel,
NASA and contractor functions, and the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2.
Sincerely,
Thomas P. Stafford
CC:
NASA/HQ/Code
NASA/HQ/Code
NASA/HQ/Code
NASA/HQ/Code
NASA/HQ/Code
NASAMQ/Code
NASAMQ/Code
NASA/HQ/Code
NASA/HQ/Code
A/Mr. Goldin
A/Gen. Dailey
A/Mr. Mort
M/Dr. Littles
M/Mr. Wisniewski
M/Mr. O'Connor
M/Mr. Trafton
M/Mr. Vantine
Z/Ms. Accola
NASA/HQ/Code A/Dr. Huntoon
NASA/JSC/Code YA/Mr. Holloway

FOURTH REPORT
OF THE
NASA ADVISORY COUNCIL
TASK FORCE ON THE SHUTTLE-MIR
RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
MISSIONS
March 1, 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1
Charter ............................................... 1
Major Finding .......................................... 1
Basis for Confidence ..................................... 1
Additional Findings - Phase 1A .............................. 3
Additional Findings - Post-Phase 1A .......................... 5
2 INTRODUCTION ............................................. 6
2.1 Background ............................................ 6
2.2 Shuttle-Mir Task Force Charter .............................. 7
2.3 Methodology ........................................... 8
3 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS .................................... 10
3.1 Processes, Hardware, and People ........................... 10
3.2 Development ........................................... 12
3.2.1 Russian Engineering Design and Manufacturing ............. 12
3.2.2 Testing Philosophy and Test Articles ..................... 14
3.2.3 Safety Assurance ................................... 14
3.3 Operations Principles ..................................... 19
3.3.1 Roles and Responsibilities ............................ 19
3.3.2 Mission Management, Communications, and Methods ........ 20
3.3.3 Training .......................................... 23
3.3.4 Medical Operations ................................. 25
4 SOYUZ TM-21, MIR 18 MAIN EXPEDITION, AND STS-71 ...............
4.1 Soyuz TM-21 ...........................................
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.2 Mir 18
4.2.1
4.2.2
30
30
Status of Baikonur .................................. 30
Soyuz Vehicle ..................................... 30
Operations Principles ................................ 33
Rendezvous and Docking ............................. 34
35Main Expedition... .................................
Mir Station ........................................ 35
Systems ......................................... 36
4.3
4.2.3 Experiments ...................................... 39
4.2.4 Mir Station Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) - Soyuz ..... 41
4.2.5 Operations Principles ................................ 42
STS-71 ............................................... 43
4.3.1 Rendezvous and Docking ............................. 44
4.3.2 Mated Operations .................................. 46
4.3.3 Separation ........................................ 46
4.3.4 Operations Principles ................................ 47
5 APPENDICES ................................................ 49
Appendix 1:
Appendix 2:
Appendix 3:
Appendix 4:
Appendix 5:
Appendix 6:
Review Team Membership List .......................... 50
Letter from Mr. Daniel S. Goldin to Lt. Gen. Thomas P.
Stafford, USAF (Ret.) ................................ 52
Preliminary Working Group Membership List ................ 53
Russian Engineering and Manufacturing Process ............. 54
Flight Certification Process ............................. 55
Acronym List ....................................... 56
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Charter
On December 6, 1994, the NASA Administrator, Mr. Daniel Goldin, requested that
Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, in his role as the chairman of the NASA Advisory
Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions, lead a
team composed of several Task Force members and technical advisors 1 to Russia
with the goal of reviewing preparations and readiness for the upcoming
International Space Station Phase 1 missions. In his directions to Gen. Stafford,
Mr. Goldin requested that the review team focus its initial efforts on safety of flight
issues for the following Phase 1A missions=:
• The Soyuz TM-21 mission which will carry U.S. astronaut Dr. Norman Thagard
and cosmonauts Lt. Col. Vladimir Dezhurov and Mr. Gennady Strekalov aboard
a Soyuz spacecraft to the Mir Station.
• The Mir 18 Main Expedition during which Thagard and his fellow cosmonauts,
Dezhurov and Strekalov, will spend approximately three months aboard the Mir
Station.
• The STS-71 Space Shuttle mission which will perform the first Shuttle-Mir
docking, carry cosmonauts Col. Anatoly Soloviev and Mr. Nikolai Budarin to the
Mir Station, and return Thagard, Dezhurov, and Strekalov to Earth.
1.2 Major Finding
In the Task Force's opinion, the joint U.S.IRusslan program is following sound
engineering and medical practices and is managing risk effectively. At this time,
them are no unacceptable threats to mission safety for the Soyuz TM-21, Mir 18
Main Expedition, or the STS-71 missions.
1.3 Basis for Confidence
The major finding of the Task Force that the Phase 1A missions face no
unacceptable risks is based on data review, interviews, discussions, and site visits
conducted by the Review Team in the United States and Russia. At the core of
the finding is the conclusion that the interface between the U.S. and Russian civil
space organizations is operating effectively and that the processes, hardware, and
people necessary to safely complete the Phase 1A missions are in place.
Both the United States and Russia can view their respective records in human
space exploration with great pride. As the Review Team came to understand the
Russian approach, it became clear that the far-reaching achievements of the
See Appendix 1 for a listing of the Review Team members.
Phase 1A includes the STS-60 and STS-63 Shuttle missions which have already
been completed.
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Soviet/Russian space effort are based on an approach which varies from that of
the U.S. more in style than in substance.
In Russia, as in the United States, the design, development and manufacturing of
human space flight hardware is very strictly managed and subject to rigorous
requirements, standards, and procedures. A recent NASA review headed by the
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in preparation for the International
Space Station Alpha (ISSA) 3 found that in almost all cases Russian standards are
equivalent to NASA standards. In reviewing Russian safety, reliability, and quality
assurance processes, Review Team members reached a similar conclusion.
The review of Russian hardware reinforced the impression that the necessary
processes are in place and are functioning effectively. While much debated, the
condition of the Baikonur Cosmodrome continues to support launch operations at
a high level. Proton, Soyuz, and other launch vehicles and their payloads are
assembled, tested, fueled, and launched to support civil and defense needs. In
1994, a total of 30 launches (11 Soyuz, 13 Proton, 4 Zenit, 1 Tsiklon, and 1
Rokot) were made from Baikonur with no failures.
The A-2, or Soyuz, booster which will be used for Soyuz TM-21 has been
responsible for over 1000 successful launches as of this report, more than the
total for all U.S. Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Shuffle launches combined. It has been
used for every manned Soviet and Russian launch. The table below provides a
summary of the reliability of this launch system.
Last 20 Flights
Last 5 Years
Last 10 Years
Total since 1963
Table 2.
100%
(20/20)
100%
(1331133)
100%
(339/339)
93.1%
(100811083)
Soyuz Booster Reliability 4
The Mir Station has been in orbit since February 1986 and has been
supported by a steady stream of Soyuz manned spacecraft and Progress
"International Space Station Alpha Program: NASAJRSA Assessment of Russian
Specs and Standards Applied to the Russian Segment", January 17, 1995.
Aviation Week and Space TechnoloQv. Feb_ary 20, 1995, p. 44.
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unmanned supply vehicles; a total of 51 crewmembers, including 11 foreign
cosmonauts, have flown on the Mir Station.
As to the final critical element-people-discussions with the NASA personnel
who have been involved in the Phase 1 program and direct interactions
during the site visits in Russia led the Review Team to conclude that
professional, technically competent people are in place throughout the
Russian space infrastructure. In addition, strong working relationships
between Russian and U.S. counterparts have developed and are continuing
to mature. These relationships have fostered a sense of mutual trust which
is absolutely essential to the success of not just Phase 1, but the entire
International Space Station program.
The most striking example to date of this mutual trust can be found in the
recently concluded STS-63 Shuttle mission which included a rendezvous with
the Mir Station. The decision on the part of the Russian team to allow
Discovery to approach to within 10 meters of the Mir Station despite the
anomaly in the Orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters was a clear
expression of the Russian team's trust in the systems knowledge, processes,
and operations management of the U.S. team.
The Review Team concluded that the Soyuz TM-211Mir 18 Main Expedition
prime and backup crews have received extensive training and are prepared
for the overall mission. On February 17, 1995, the prime and backup crews
completed certification testing; both received an overall rating of
"outstanding". This readiness certification of the crewmembers took place
aller completion of a comprehensive, three day, graded evaluation of crew
performance.
The STS-71 mission has already been the subject of considerable review by
the overall Task Force. Development Test Objective (DTO) results to date
have confirmed the accuracy of engineering models and demonstrated the
completeness and accuracy of training and procedures, Flight data,
demonstrations, and data analysis results continue to add to the confidence
that the STS-71 mission as planned will meet its objectives successfully with
the desired safety margins.
1.4 Additional Findings-Phase 1A
In addition to the major finding that it is safe to proceed with the Phase 1A
missions, there are several additional findings relating to Phase 1A which
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have emerged from the review process (the reference numbers refer to the
specific section in the body of report which contains the recommendation):
The Phase 1 Program Office should reassess adequacy of Mir StaUon
communicaUons coverage to enhance mission safety as well as mission
success. (Reference 3.3.2.1)
Given the Iimbd time remaining unUl the Soyuz TM-21 launch, the
following recommendations for on-site medical support and emergency
preparations at Baikonur must be acted upon Immediately:
- The NASA flight surgeons at the Baikonur launch site must be
provided _ an Independent communications capeb,ity allowing
direct access to the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC).
A NASA flight surgeon must be cleared to accompany the Soyuz TM-
21 U.S. crewmember from Baikonur to Moscow In the event a medical
evacuation is required.
AH NASA personnel working at the Baikonur Cosmodrome must be
Immunized against Hepatitis B.
- The NASA flight surgeons should be supplemented wilh a Registered
Nurse/Emergency Medical Technician since the flight surgeons will not
be working In close proximity to one another at the launch site.
(Reference 3.3.4.1)
Prior to the TM-21 launch, NASA must InveslJgate the clinical resources
available for treatment of the U.S. crewmember as well as the practical
options for Vansferdng care of the crewmember to U.S. care at the
Chkalovsky Air Base, Including medical evacuation to the U.S. Air Force
Base at Ramstein, Germany. (Reference 3.3.4.2)
Medical communicaUons between the Institute for Biomedical Problems
(IBMP) and NASA JSC should be by dedicated service available
throughout the Phase 1A missions` (Reference 3.3.4.3)
The Joint Medical Support Plan should he agreed upon and Implemented
prompUy to avoid potent_l conflicts during the course of the mission_
(Reference 3.3.4.4)
• NASA must tailor expectations for science during the Mir 18 Main
Expedition due to the late arrival of experiment hardware and flight
procedures, Emphasis in the science area should focus solely on
astronaut Thagard's efforts to characterize the Mir Station environment and
provide valuable lessons on how to best achieve U.S. sclenlffic goals
aboard Mir Station. The successful completion of specl_ experiments
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should be viewed within this context rather than as a separate measure of
success. (Reference 4.2.3.1)
• If the assistance of a cosmonaut is not available during the Mir 18 Main
ExpedWon to conduct lime critical experiments, the experiments which
require that assistance should be rescheduled. (Reference 4.2.3.2)
• The remaining invasive protocol for Mir 18 Main Expedition crewmembers,
the calcium-chloride Infusion scheduled to occur aboard the Shuffle during
STS-71, should be carefully reviewed by medical operations before
Implementation. (Reference 4.2.3.4)
1.5 Additional Findings - Post-Phase 1A
There are several additional findings relating to the missions beyond Phase
1A which have emerged from the review process (the reference numbers
refer to the specific section in the body of report which contains the
recommendation):
Every effort should be made to retain key U.S. personnel who serve as
Interfaces to Russian organizations in their respective positions.
(Reference 3.1.1)
• Reciprocal U.S.IRusslan payload safety certification should be assessed.
(Reference 3.2.3.1)
All U.S. crewmembers who will be serving on the Mir Station must be
Identified no less than two years prior to their mission in order to begin the
necessary language training. (Reference 3.3.3.1)
• It is imperative that flight and training hardware for U.S. experiments as
well as flight procedures for U.S. experiments be available in Russia in
accordance with a joinUy agreed upon schedule. In the event that the
necessary Items are not available wUhin that schedule, the experiment
should be postponed or cancelled. (Reference 4.2.3.3)
Implementation of NASA Institutional automated data processing and
telecommunications (ADP/T) capabillUes in Russia must be given a high
priority. (Reference 4.2.3.5)
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2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Background
In October 1992, Russia and the U.S. formally agreed to conduct a
fundamentally new program of human cooperation in space. This original
"Shuttle-Mir" project encompassed combined astronaut-cosmonaut activities
on the Shuttle, Soyuz, and Mir Station. In November 1993 the scope of the
planned cooperation was expanded considerably and became Phase 1 of the
Intemational Space Station Alpha program. This expanded program
combines the original Shuttle-Mir program with additional Shuttle flights to the
Mir Station and U.S. crews aboard the Mir Station.
Phase 1 represents the building block to create the experience and technical
expertise for an International Space Station. The Phase 1 program brings
together the United States and Russia in a major cooperative and contractual
program that takes advantage of both countries' capabilities.
The content of the Phase 1 program consists of the following elements as
defined by the Phase 1 Program Management Plan, dated October 6, 1994:
• Up to ten Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking missions between 1995 and
1997
• Astronaut long duration presence on Mir Station
• Requirements for Mir Station support of Phase 1 when astronauts are not
on board
• Outfitting Spektr and Priroda modules with NASA science, research, and
risk mitigation equipment
• Related ground support requirements of NASA and the Russian Space
Agency (RSA) to support Phase 1
• Integrated NASA and RSA launch schedules and manifests
The primary advantages of Phase 1 are that "it will provide valuable
experience and test data that will greatly reduce technical risks associated
with the construction and operation of the International Space Station. The
Space Station Program will be enhanced by combined space operations and
joint space technology demonstrations. Moreover, Phase 1 will provide early
opportunities for extended [duration] scientific and research activities. "6
5 "Addendum to Program Implementation Plan", 1 November 1993, p. 1.
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2.2 Shuttle-Mir Task Force Charter
In May 1994, the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking
Missions was established by the NASA Advisory Council. Its purpose is to
review Phase 1 (Shuttle-Mir) planning, training, operations, rendezvous and
docking, and management and to provide interim reports containing specific
recommendations to the Advisory Council.
The first meeting of the Task Force was held at the Johnson Space Center
(JSC) on May 24 and 25, 1994 with a preliminary report submitted to the
NASA Advisory Council on June 6, 1994. The second meeting of the Task
Force was held at JSC on July 12 and 13, 1994 and a detailed report
containing a series of specific recommendations was submitted on July 29,
1994. The third Task Force meeting was held at JSC on October 11 and 12,
1994. The briefings presented at that meeting reviewed NASA's response to
the Task Force recommendations made to date and provided background
data and current status on several critical areas which the Task Force had
not addressed in its previous reports. The third report, released on
November 2, 1994, focused on management; mission requirements; the
Orbiter Docking System (ODS); plume, docking, and mated loads; and
rendezvous and docking.
On December 6, 1994, NASA Administrator, Mr. Daniel Goldin requested that
Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, in his role as the chairman of the NASA
Advisory Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking
Missions, "lead a team composed of several Task Force members and
technical advisors to Russia to review preparations and readiness for the
upcoming international Space Station Phase 1 missions. "e
The Russian Space Agency (RSA) identified Academician Vladimir Utkin,
Director of the Central Scientific Research Institute for Machine Building
(TsNIIMASH), as Gen. Stafford's counterpart in this effort.
In his directions to Gen. Stafford's Russian Review Team, Mr. Goldin
requested that the team focus its initial efforts on safety of flight issues for
the remaining Phase 1A missions:
Letter, Mr. Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford,
Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on the ShutUe-Mir
Rendezvous and Docking Missions, December 6, 1994 (see Appendix 2).
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• The Soyuz TM-21 mission which will carry U.S. astronaut Dr. Norman
Thagard and cosmonauts Lt. Col. Vladimir Dezhurov and Mr. Gennady
Strekalov aboard a Soyuz spacecraft to the Mir Station.
• The Mir 18 Main Expedition during which Thagard and his fellow
cosmonauts, Dezhurov and Strekalov, will spend three months aboard the
Mir Station.
• The STS-71 Space Shuttle mission which will perform the first Shuttle-Mir
docking, carry cosmonauts Col. Anatoly Soloviev and Mr. Nikolai Budarin
to the Mir Station, and return Thagard, Dezhurov, and Strekalov to Earth.
Mr. Goldin requested that the Review Team complete the review and submit
its final report prior to March 1, 1995.
2.3 Methodology
Given the compressed schedule for the review activity, Gen. Stafford
assembled a Preliminary Working Group, led by Maj. Gen. Joe H. Engle,
USAF (Ret.) and composed of several Review Team members 7. Supported
by a number of technical advisors, the Preliminary Working Group worked
full-time collecting data, conducting interviews, and carrying out preliminary
analysis. Over the course of two months the Preliminary Working Group
interviewed a wide range of individuals, including NASA and contractor
managers, engineers, and technical staff as well as foreign astronauts who
have flown on both Soyuz and Mir Station.
In addition to providing critical background data and surfacing issues, the
results of the interviews and meetings were used to plan a series of site
visits by the Preliminary Working Group in Russia from January 9 through
January 21, 1995. While in Russia the Preliminary Working Group visited the
Russian Space Agency, Khrunichev State Research and Production Space
Center, Central Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building
(TsNIIMASH), Mission Control Center - Moscow (MCC-M), Rocket Space
Corporation - Energia (RSC-Energia), Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center
(GCTC), and the Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP).
The Preliminary Working Group also held discussions with the Directors of
the NASA Liaison Office and the Space Station Technical Liaison Office in
Russia as well as members of their technical staff; Mr. Vladimir Sambaiew,
Environment, Science, and Technology Counselor to the Ambassador; and
Dr. Nicholas Riesland, Embassy Resident Medical Officer.
See Appendix 3 for a listing of the Preliminary Working Group members.
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On January 31 and February 1, 1995 the Preliminary Working Group briefed
Gen. Stafford and the entire Review Team at the Kennedy Space Center.
This included an overview of general observations applying to all phases of
Phase 1A such as Russian design, manufacturing, and safety processes as
well as the principles for joint operations. It also included specific
preparations for the individual Phase 1A missions.
On February 1 - 2, 1995 the Review Team met with Academician Utkin and a
number of his technical advisors at the Kennedy Space Center. In addition
to discussions relating to preparations in Russia for Phase 1A, NASA
preparations for the STS-71 mission were reviewed and detailed responses
to Academician Utkin's questions provided.
On February 6, 1995 the Review Team was briefed on the status of the
Phase 1A missions by senior NASA officials. This included discussions with
the Administrator, the Acting Chief Engineer, the Associate Administrator for
Space Flight, the Phase 1 Program Manager, the Associate Administrator for
Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications, his deputy, and the
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance.
Between February 7 - 18, 1995, the Review Team travelled to Russia for a
series of meetings, interviews, and site visits, including the Russian Space
Agency, Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center,
TsNIIMASH, MCC-M, RSC-Energia, GCTC, and IBMP. While in Russia, the
Review Team travelled to the Baikonour Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan on
February 15 to observe the launch of Progress M-26. Two days later, the
Review Team witnessed the automatic docking of Progress M-26 to the Mir
Station from MCC-M.
On February 19, 1995, an open meeting of the Task Force was held at
NASA Headquarters. Notice of this meeting was posted in the Federal
Register per the Federal Advisory Committee ACt. At this open meeting, the
Review Team members presented their findings and observations. From that
discussion, the findings contained in this report were developed.
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3 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
3.1 Processes, Hardware, and People
OBSERVATIONS
It is the opinion of the Review Team that the NASA and Russian processes
as well as the hardware and people interfaces are working effectively.
Processes
The Review Team drew heavily on the work of NASA's joint working groups
and technical experts whose efforts began back in August 1993. This work
has involved extensive discussions with Russian technical experts as well as
in-depth penetration of Russian hardware and subsystems design and
performance including engineering specifications and standards. = In concert
with their findings, it is the conclusion of the Review Team that the necessary
processes (e.g., design, manufacturing, safety, operations, etc.) are in place.
The Central Scientific Research Institute for Machine Building (TsNIIMASH)
and the State Acceptance Verification Board are the two principal participants
in the safety, reliability, and quality assurance involved in these processes.
TsNIIMASH provides independent review and approval at each stage of the
development and acceptance process including customer acceptance testing.
The State Acceptance Verification Board certifies flight hardware and
software prior to each flight including prelaunch operations (similar to NASA's
Flight Readiness Review).
Hardware
The effectiveness of the processes is evidenced by the highly successful
record of the Russian space program. Over the past 10 years the
performance record of the Soyuz booster has been perfect - out of 339
launches of the Soyuz booster there have been no failures 9. The Mir Station
Examples of the studies conducted in this area include "The Russian FGB
Tug/Energy Block Assessment", October 1993; "Technical Assessment of Mir-1
Life Support Hardware for the International Space Station", March 1994; and
"International Space Station Alpha: NASA/RSA Assessment of Russian Specs
and Standards Applied to the Russian Segment", January 1995.
Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 20, 1995, p. 44.
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is also proven hardware. There is a program in place to recertify it annually
as well as before each mission; to maintain it through regular and as-needed
replacement of component; and extend its lifetime as well as enhance its
capabilities. However, certain system margins and vulnerabilities require
continued attention.
People
Discussions with the NASA personnel who have been involved in the Phase
1 program and direct interactions during the site visits in Russia, led the
Review Team to conclude that professional, technically competent people are
in place throughout the Russian space infrastructure. Strong working
relationships between Russian and U.S. counterparts have developed and
are continuing to mature. These relationships have fostered a sense of
mutual trust which has manifested itself in a number of ways. Examples
include:
• The effectiveness of the joint working groups in addressing areas such
as Management; Safety Assurance; Flight Operations and Systems
Integration; Mission Science; Crew Training and Exchange; Mir
Operations and Systems Integration; Extravehicular Activity; and
Medical Operations. These management and technical forums have
generated numerous decisions and agreements in which one party
accepted the technical recommendation of the other based on
available supporting data plus respect for the other's capabilities and
record.
The willingness to address technical questions of the Review Team
during the site visits in Russia.
The joint operations conducted during STS-63. This is perhaps the
most striking example to date as it involved hardware and people
operating cooperatively in space as well as on the ground. No better
example of the trust which has developed on both sides exists than
the decision of the Russian team to allow Discovery to approach within
10 meters of the Mir Station despite the anomaly in the Orbiter
Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters. In making that decision, the
Russian team depended largely on the assurances of the NASA team
that the Mir Station was not endangered by allowing the approach to
proceed.
A principal element in the development of mutual trust is the continuity of the
NASA team. For the Russians, many of whom have been working within the
same area for years and even decades, it is important to deal with the same
individuals on the NASA side over time. Only through this continuous
exposure and common effort can the necessary joint technical proficiency
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and trust be established. Should a replacement be made on the NASA side,
this process essentially begins again. Likewise, the introduction of too many
NASA participants into the process can be confusing and make it difficult for
the Russian participants to determine who is authorized to act on specific
issues. A number of Russian officials also commented to Review Team
members on the negative impact that large numbers of NASA visitors (i.e.,
those requesting tours of facilities without a pressing reason to make such a
visit) is having on their ability to get work done.
RECOMMENDATION
3.1.1 Every effort should be made to retain key U.S. personnel who serve
as Interfaces to Russian organizations in their respective positions.
3.2 Development
3.2.1 Russian Engineering Design and Manufacturing
OBSERVATIONS
There is no question that differences exist between NASA engineering
design and manufacturing processes and those in place in Russia. As
a recent study of Russian specifications and standards observed,
however, "this is to be expected and would be encountered in any ...
assessment of a U.S. aerospace contractor's specifications and
standards. "1° The report went on to cite a number of specific
differences including:
• RSA [Russian Space Agency] relies on operator/technician
experlJse versus written requirements for process control
• Limited number of Russian vendors/suppliers/contractors eliminates
many verification requirements
• All Russian enterprises generally use the same
specifications/standards and requirements
• RSA uses more damage tolerant (low strength, ductile, etc.)
matedais
• Significant amount of verification testing is used by RSA to
determine if components meet end use requirements
• RSA relies on lot-to-lot testing to verify specification minimums
versus material design allowables with a statistical basis 11
10
11
"lntemational Space Station Alpha Program: NASA/RSA Assessment of Russian
Specs and Standards Applied to the Russian Segment", January 17, 1995, p. 26.
Ibid, p. 27.
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During the Review Team site visits and discussions in Russia, its
members encountered these differences and a number of others as
well. The source of these differences are the diverse paths which the
U.S. and Russian space programs have pursued over the past forty
years. 12 Many factors such as available resources and technology
influenced these independent courses; however, the reliability and
safety of the end products of the two programs are not significantly
different.
The Russian engineering design and manufacturing process, as
related to members of the Review Team, consists of 26 steps divided
into four stages. The engineering design process is an iterative one in
which a pattern of testing, followed by modification, followed by
retesting is used extensively. 1_ The 26 steps are based on standards
set by the Russian government to which very little change is allowed
without a significant review cycle.
In addition, the accumulated experience of the Russian aerospace
industry is impressive as is the long-term commitment of management,
engineers, and technicians to their individual firms. Many individuals
in the Russian industry have spent their entire career in the same
organization and, oftentimes, within a given program.
Based on the site visits and the many discussion with Russian
technical personnel, the Review Team concluded that while the NASA
and Russian engineering design and manufacturing processes differ in
many areas, the Russian processes are thorough and effective. The
Team saw no evidence that the Russian processes in any way
compromise safety.
12
13
See Appendix 4 (Russian Engineering Design and Manufacturing Process).
One aspect that highlights the different paths taken by the U.S. and Russia is the
evolutionary nature of Russian development. This is evidenced by the vehicles
involved in Phase 1. The two-and-a-haft stage Soyuz rocket has over 1000
launches to its credit since 1963. The Soyuz spacecraft has been in use since the
late 1960s. The modules of the Mir Station have evolved from the Salyut series of
Russian space stations which first saw service in the early 1970s.
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3.2.2 Testing Philosophy and Test Articles
OBSERVATIONS
The Russian certification test network appears to be just as
sophisticated and comprehensive as the NASA certification test
network. All levels of ground testing are conducted including
component tests, qualification tests, subsystem tests, system tests,
and integrated system tests.
A wide range of test articles are produced and tested from the design
stage through flight and on through the on-orbit lifetime of the flight
unit. Examples include the mock-up and manufacturing aid; structural
test article; thermal vacuum test article; propulsion system test article;
electrical analog article; life support test article; and crew training
simulators.
The Russian approach has advantages. One important example is the
practice of maintaining a full-scale integrated test version of the flight
article on the ground. This "fleet leader" provides the capability to
monitor ongoing systems performance and aid in anomaly resolution,
life prediction, and hardware compatibility checkout before launch.
3.2.3 Safety Assurance
OBSERVATIONS
In order to fully understand the Russian approach to safety and
reliability one must first understand the critical role TsNIIMASH plays
in the Russian space program.
TsNIIMASH
The Central Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building
(TsNIIMASH) maintains the safety and reliability standards for
operations in space. They have a major responsibility for hardware
certification during development of every Russian spacecraft from
design through operation.
TsNIIMASH, as it has been caged since 1967, was founded in 1946 as
the chief research organization in the missile end space industry of the
USSR... TsNIIMASH has been a leading Institute in the Russian
space industry performing the following work:
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basic scientific and systems analysis research to determine the
basic direddons of development and the technical appearance of
future space and missile technology (launch vehicles, manned and
automatic spacecraft, orbital stations) and preparation and
expertise in the space programs;
theoretical and expedmental space research of aerogasodynamic,
acoustic, and thermal loads in the atmosphere of the earth and other
planets and in outer space, work on thermal resistance of heat protection
in high temperature gas currents, computational/theoreUcal research and
expadmental work on design strength under conditions of static,
vibrodynamic, impact, and thermal loads;
flight control of spacecraft, research and development on original methods
and algorithms for solving control, ballistics, and navigation tasks,
development of methods and means of flight control in orbit, dudng
orientation, stabilization and maneuvering in orbit, and during descent and
landing of products of missile and space technology; and
ensuring reliability of missile and space technology, standardization and
product uniformity, cerlfficatJonand quarry control. This includes detailed
expert opinions on the project documentation by the organizations
developing space vehicles, launch vehicles, and basic systems as well as
instruments. It also includes expert opinions on the progress of
produddons and the adequacy of ground work on basic products in the
industry,t4
TsNIIMASH is composed of eight directorates with approximately
8,500 employees. These directorates are the Center of Systematic
Design, Center of Systematic Research, Space Flight Control Center
(Mission Control Center- Moscow), Center of Research and
Experimental Works, Center of Heat Exchange Research, Center of
Aerogas Dynamics Research, Center of Strength Research, and
Technical/Engineering Services.
Because of their long history and extensive role, TsNIIMASH
possesses the large body of historical data used to address specific
design and engineering issues. This is particularly significant since
Russian hardware design is evolutionary; prior space heritage is
evident back to Vostok. As with the design and manufacturing
process, the senior managers, engineers, and technicians involved in
the safety and reliability assurance process have been in place for an
14 Igor A. Reshetin (General Director, TsNIIMASH Export), rl'he IntemaUonal Work of
TsNIIMASH in the Field of Space Research", a paper presented at Draper
Laboratories on March 16, 1994.
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extended period of time (most since Gagarin's flight on April 12,1961)
and represent a valuable resource.
TsNIIMASH's role in safety, reliability, and quality assurance spans the
entire product lifecycle. It is responsible for the development of
standards, review of their implementation in design, manufacture and
test, approval of the ground certification plan, the processing of
waivers, determination of system margins, certification of life
extension, review of flight anomalies and corrective actions, etc.
TsNIIMASH is the independent oversight arm of RSA and as such
also conducts customer acceptance testing; it provides the guarantee
of performance, safety and reliability +5.
Extensive documentation is developed dudng each stage of the
design, manufacturing, and testing process. This data package is
termed the "pasport" and is critical in the reliability assurance program.
Configuration management of documentation is maintained through
central control of the documents. The State Verification Acceptance
Board issues a certification statement based on the following
elements:
• Designer information
• Manufacturing information which includes the "pasport"
package completed for each manufacturing step
• "Expert opinion letters" or expertise statements
• Prelaunch operations manual
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance {$R&QA) Process
Design, development, and manufacturing of Russian human space
flight hardware is strictly managed; all components including the
launch vehicle are specially controlled as safety critical and are
traceable. Rigorous requirements, standards, and procedures are in
place. A recent review by MSFC in preparation for Space StaUon
found that in almost all cases equivalency to NASA's standards
existed. TM Every step in the design, development, and certification
phase is determined by documents agreed to at the beginning. Two
15
16
See Appendix 5 (Flight Certification Process).
"International Space Station Alpha Program: NASA/RSA Assessment of Russian
Specs and Standards Applied to the Russian Segment", January 17, 1995.
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documents: the design, development, test, and evaluation plan and the
safety and reliability assurance plan are mandatory for program
approval and the Authority To Proceed. These must be coordinated
with TsNIIMASH and other institutes as appropriate (e.g., Institute of
Thermal Processes, Institute for Mechanical Processes, etc.) A
program phase is considered complete only when it has received
cognizant institute and TsNIIMASH approval. Institutes review
sufficiency of the technical program and reliability assurance program
and participate in major integrated tests.
During hardware manufacturing, military representatives from the
Ministry of Defense and/or the Military Space Forces are on-site to
provide government oversight. Performance waivers and deviations
are referred back to the cognizant Institutes for Technology and
TsNIIMASH for disposition and approval. Safety-critical deviations
receive a special review. When explicitly asked, RSA, Khrunichev,
RSC Energia, and TsNIIMASH all stated that the proper execution of
requirements and standards has not been affected by the breakup of
the U.S.S.R. Full oversight of manufacturing by the military, applying
the same standards as those in force prior to the breakup of the
Soviet Union, continues within the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. All
previous requirements are still in force.
In addition to the above testing and development review process, a
military acceptance team also monitors the process. This team is a
separate, independent group not subordinate to RSA or the customer
and not paid by the customer.
Readiness of the flight article to enter its next phase (e.g., Preliminary
Design Review, Critical Design Review, Acceptance, Preshipment,
etc.) is determined only after all testing and analysis have been
completed and all comments taken into consideration.
For manned space launches, the determination is made by the Special
State Commission under the leadership of Col. General Ivanov
(Commander in Chief of the Military Space Forces), Mr. Boris
Ostroumov, deputy RSA chief, and Mr. Semenov, General Director,
Energia. All other interested parties are represented including
builders, users, government agencies, and Institutes.
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Software Independent Validation an_ Verification (IV&V)
Software IV&V is one example where Russian standards differ
significantly from United States established practices. Khartron in
Kharkov, Ukraine produces the software for the Soyuz (A-2) launch
vehicle. RSC Energia produces software for the Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft as well as the Mir Station and modules. No IV&V is
performed on these software products during any phase. Although
internal review processes were reported to be in place at Khartron and
RSC Energia, no independent audits or IV&V are performed.
However, this software is much simpler and less integrated than that
found in the Shuttle. To date no software problems have been
identified in the Soyuz (A-2) launch vehicle.
_afety and the Launch Process
The Special State Commission also assesses readiness at a variety of
stages in the prelaunch process (e.g., prior to pad rollout, prior to
launch, etc.). Safety does not have a representative on the
Commission; however, the Commission receives reports from each
group of specialists responsible for various systems and ground
services with safety represented in each group.
The last decision is made four hours prior to launch by the
Commission. At that time a final report by TsNIIMASH and the
Military Space Forces is presented. All on the Commission must be
=go" for launch. Anomaly resolution during the final countdown
similarly requires full consensus.
OBSERVATIONS - PAYLOAD SAFETY CERTIFICATION
Currently, any Russian equipment flown aboard the Shuttle is subject
to payload safety certification. U.S. equipment flown aboard Soyuz,
Progress, and Mir Station requires Russian certification. This process
could be greatly simplified if the experience and maturity of each
country's system would be recognized by the other. Serious
consideration should be given to accepting the safety certification of
the other partner's testing.
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RECOMMENDATION
3.2.3.1 Reciprocal U.S./Russian payload safety certification should
be assessed.
3.3 Operations Principles
3.3.1 Roles and Responsibilities
OBSERVATIONS
Each country will be responsible for the following:
• Planning, training, execution and control of their respective
spacecraft and its mission.
• Safety of astronauts and cosmonauts on-board their
respective spacecraft - Soyuz, Mir Station, and Shuttle.
• Operations of its own control center and network systems,
with technical personnel in the other country's control
facilities and participation as appropriate.
Each countrywill be responsible for adequate coordination with the
other side when conditions may cause:
• Major changes to plans.
• Potential safety or health impacts to the crew.
• Possible interactive effects on the other vehicle or operation
(e.g., the leak in an RCS thruster during the STS-63-Mir
Station rendezvous and proximity operations)
In the discharge of these roles and responsibilities, it is necessary to
understand the similarities and differences between the two country's
operations and the different roles between the on-board crew and the
Mission Control Center. The Russian concept of mission control is, for
the most part, similar to NASA's. The most significant difference is the
philosophy of preparation for anomalous performance of spacecraft or
crew. The Russian approach to preparation for anomalies is to train
intently only for life-threatening events. Less than life threatening
anomaly preparation does not include intensive ground-based training,
although procedures my be prepared in advance. A frequent result is
that mission objectives are not completed while the crew or MCC-M
prepares to correct the anomaly, but crew safety is not reduced.
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3.3.2
MCC-M is responsible for command and control of the mission
following separation from the launch vehicle. The generic
responsibilities are:
• Monitoring and analysis of spacecraft systems performance.
• Daily flight planning.
• Tracking, orbit prediction and maneuver planning.
• Crew health monitoring.
• Supporting experiment operations.
• Generating and uplinking commands.
• Providing data to payload sponsor organizations.
• Providing spacecraft systems data to remotely located
systems specialists.
• Managing and assuring the support of the tracking and
communications network.
• Communicating information to the search and rescue
forces.
A Lead Flight Director has overall mission command and control
responsibility, similar to a combination of NASA's Lead Flight Director
and JSC Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Manager positions in
the MCC-H. A small team of NASA technical personnel also are
located in the MCC-M during periods when U.S. astronauts are on-
board.
The MCC-M team consists of four shifts of personnel. Each shift is
led by a Shift Flight Director whose responsibilities are comparable to
those of his NASA counterpart. Each team is staffed with specialists
to perform the tasks necessary to accomplish the above functions.
The flight crew is responsible for:.
• Executing the flight plan.
• Manually controlling on-board systems when necessary.
• Monitoring on-board displays.
• Maintaining and repairing on-board systems.
• Taking immediate action to safe critical situations.
Mission Management, Communications, and Methods
OBSERVATIONS - RUSSIAN AUTONOMOUS MISSION PHASES
For Soyuz TM-21 rendezvous and the Mir-18 Main Expedition, MCC-M
has unilateral responsibility for mission management. The Russian
chain of command follows the same principles as the NASA mission
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management protocol. MCC-M is responsible for mission continuation
decisions. The on-board commander is responsible for safety related
decisions requiring immediate action. MCC-M originated deviations
from planned activities are coordinated between MCC-M, support
elements, and the crew.
MCC-M provides flight plan information, on-board systems monitoring,
management and performance analysis. MCC-M also provides orbit
determination, maneuver planning, and state vector updates. The
crew has wide latitude in scheduling and performing routine
maintenance or repair activities.
The crew can terminate or take over manual control of station keeping
and docking activity. In an emergency, the crew can evacuate the Mir
Station by retreating to the Soyuz spacecraft and separating from the
station. This does not require ground control.
OBSERVATIONS - STS-71 MISSION
For STS-71, mission management is based on the principle of shared
responsibility for interactive periods between the two spacecraft (Mir
Station and Atlantis). While docked, MCC-M and the Mir 18 Main
Expedition commander are responsible for crew health and safety as
well as protection of vehicle assets on the Mir Station side of the
docking interface. Likewise, MCC-H and the Shuffle commander are
responsible for crew health and safety as well as protection of vehicle
assets on the Shuttle side of the docking interface.
Detailed plans, procedures, and protocols are defined for nominal joint
activities. A process for coordinating in-flight changes between MCC-
H and MCC-M as well as between the crews has been defined.
Mission rules are established for responsibility and response to
identified contingencies during rendezvous, station-keeping, docking
and docked flight.
Dedicated, redundant communication links between MCC-H and MCC-
M as well as the Atlantis-Mir Station VHF communication system
provide the capability to assure a coordinated execution of the
mission.
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OBSERVATIONS - MCC-M AND SOYUZ/MIR STATION
COMMUNICATIONS
In January 1991 the fleet of ocean-going tracking ships was phased
out of Mir Station operations to save funds. Some of the ships
continue to operate to support unmanned missions and could step in
as a backup when needed to support Mir Station. By mid-February,
the Mir Station was spending up to 9 continuous hours out of contact
with MCC-M because of tracking system cutbacks. 17
The elimination of the ocean-going tracking ships has left MCC-M to
Soyuz/Mir Station communications reliant upon the six Russian
national ground stations and the Luch communications satellite
network. These systems provide voice, telemetry, television (uplink
and downlink), command, and tracking modes.
The extended Loss of Signal (LOS) time under which the Mir Station
often operates was a contributor to the chain of events which resulted
in the electrical power emergency aboard Mir Station in October 1994
(discussed further in the Mir Station Systems section of this report).
Until recently, Russian satellite communications capability relied upon
a single Luch satellite. A second Luch relay satellite was launched in
December 1994 and has been incorporated into the communications
network. Use of this capability was demonstrated during the STS-63
"fly-around" which occurred on February 8, 1995 and the Progress M-
26 rendezvous and docking on February 17, 1995.
RECOMMENDATION
3.3.2.1 The Phase 1 Program Office should reassess adequacy of
Mir Station communications coverage to enhance mission
safety as well as mission success.
OBSERVATIONS - MCC-M AND MCC-H COMMUNICATIONS
For STS-71 twelve voice lines (loops) are planned between MCC-M
and MCC-H. The number of loops planned for the Mir 18 Main
Expedition are less than for STS-71 because there are fewer
requirements. Communications requirements will, for the most part,
17 David S. F. Portree, "Mir Hardware Heritage", NASA/JSC (JSC 26770), October
1994, pp. 130-131.
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3.3.3
be limited to the U.S. technical personnel in Moscow and the medical
experiment personnel in Houston. For STS-71, voice and facsimile
data will be transmitted across the loops for mission coordination and
joint command and control.
Interpreters are provided by both sides for real time voice
communications and facsimile message translation.
Plans and protocols are established for:.
• Communications loop management, both nominal and
contingency.
• Planned communications sessions for data exchanges,
vehicle status reports, state vector transmission, and joint
mission rule implementation
• Unscheduled sessions for changes to procedures,
documentation, or for attitude change requests.
• Language utilization between MCC-H and MCC-M and
between spacecraft.
Utilization of these loops is practiced during joint simulations.
Training
OBSERVATIONS
Crew training is the responsibility of the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training
Center (GCTC) in Star City, Russia located 40 km northeast of
Moscow. Normal and emergency training for all phases of the Soyuz
TM-21 mission and Mir 18 Main Expedition were conducted using
simulators of varying degrees of fidelity located in and around Star
City. Overall crew training provided by GCTC was evaluated as being
professional and thorough.
Training sessions take approximately fourteen months and are
conducted in Russian. The first several months are lightly loaded in
technical material to allow foreign crewmembers to become proficient
at the working level with both written and spoken Russian language.
Although language training also is conducted at Star City during these
first few months it is critical that the crewmembers arrive at Star City
with at least a conversational grasp of Russian. Six months of full-
time language training is considered to be the minimum time
necessary to arrive at this proficiency for non-Russian speakers. Crew
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selection must be early enough to allow for dedicated, specialized
language training prior to arrival in Russia.
In the case of cabin pressure loss, the crew has been trained in leak
detection and emergency repair procedures. A special vacuum
chamber facility located at Chkalovsky Air base, Star City is used for
this training. A flight-representative Mir core module, Kvant II and
Soyuz are located inside the vacuum chamber. During training the
crew practices leak detection and isolation procedures. Training is
conducted under flight-like conditions with the exception that drag-
through ventilation ducts and electrical wiring are not present.
Systems training and periodic testing is conducted on all aspects and
phases of Soyuz and Mir Station operations. Flight readiness
certification of the crewmembers only takes place after completion of a
comprehensive, three day, graded evaluation of crew performance.
One day each is allotted for normal and emergency procedures
associated with:
• Launch, rendezvous and docking
• Orbit operations
• Deorbit and landing.
Evaluation is conducted under realistic conditions and the crew are in
pressure suits for launch, rendezvous and docking, deorbit and landing
phases. Upon successful completion of all phases, the Commanding
General of GCTC and his deputies certify the crew as ready for flight.
On February 17, 1995, the Soyuz TM-21/Mir 18 Main Expedition prime
and backup crews completed this certification testing. Both crews
received an overall rating of "outstanding".
Following certification for flight, additional proficiency training is
conducted primarily in the manual rendezvous and docking phases
both at GCTC and using similar facilities located at the Baikonur
Cosmodrome located in Kazakhstan until the day preceding launch.
Experiment training for the Mir 18 Main Expedition was conducted in
Star City and at the Johnson Space Center. Russian training
specialists were indoctrinated in the experiments and procedures and
were then to provide training in Russian to all crawmembers.
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3.3.4
RECOMMENDATION
3.3.3.1 All U.S. crewmembers who will be serving on the Mir
Station must be identified no less than two years prior to
their mission in order to begin the necessary language
b'aining.
Medical Operations
OBSERVATIONS - RESPONSIBILITY FOR CREW HEALTH
Preflight
Responsibility for Soyuz TM-211Mir 18 Main Expedition preflight
medical monitoring and training has been retained by the Gagarin
Cosmonaut Training Center (GCTC) staff. NASA flight surgeons have
been involved in all aspects of training and preflight medical
preparations. As part of the process, NASA provided Russia with
complete sets of medical records and annual certifications.
Both the prime and backup crews for Soyuz TM-211Mir 18 Main
Expedition were medically certified on February 8, 1995.
The Russian and U.S. representatives have established a Joint
Medical Policy Board to coordinate policy for medical support during
Phase 1A. Drso Arnauld Nicogossian and Sam Pool will represent
NASA and Dr. Anatoly I. Gregoriev (Director, institute for Biomedical
Problems) and Gen. Berezhnov (Ministry of Defense) will represent the
Russian space effort.
Launch
The responsibility for crew health will be retained by the Gagarin
Cosmonaut Training Center staff through the launch phase. If an on
pad or launch abort occurs over Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) territory, responsibility for recovery is relegated to the ground
Recovery Force which is operated by the Russian military.
Temporary, inflatable "hospital faciliUes" can be erected on site within
thirty minutes and are staffed by Russian anesthesiologists,
emergency physicians, surgeons, neurosurgeons, and other support
staff members. There is also a hospital in the nearby town of Leninsk;
however, its capabilities are unknown. It must be also noted that
Hepatitis B is a major health hazard in the BaikonurlLeninsk area.
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The details of the Russian emergency medical plan is classified and
will not be revealed to the NASA flight surgeons until fourteen days
prior to launch.
The NASA flight surgeons are both certified in Advanced Trauma Life
Support (ATLS) and Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) and will
be at the launch site. They will participate in the stabilization of the
U.S. astronaut and are equipped with self contained emergency
medical packs. It is essential that one of the NASA flight surgeons
accompany the astronaut if medical evacuation from Baikonur is
required. It is also important for the NASA flight surgeons at Baikonur
to have an independent means of communication which will allow
them to contact MCC-H and/or NASA JSC directly.
The NASA flight surgeons must be supplemented at Baikonur with a
Registered Nurse/Emergency Medical Technician (RNIEMT) since the
flight surgeons will not be working in close proximity to one another at
the launch site. One will be assigned to the launch site and the other
downrange. The downrange flight surgeon with the Recovery Forces
will require the presence of the RN/EMT. Russian Medevac
helicopters are available in Kazakhstan at the launch site and down
range to recover the crew and bring them to emergency facilities.
Transportation to Chkalovsky Air Base, Star City will be provided by
the Russian Recovery Force. The transportation link from Kazakhstan
to Moscow will be by Russian fixed wing aircraft standing by at
Baikonur with an approximate flying time of 3.5 hours. The intlight
medical capability is appropriate for transport.
RECOMMENDATIONS
3.3.4.1 Given the limited lime remaining until the Soyuz TM-21
launch, the following recommendations for on-site medical
support and emergency preparations must be acted upon
Immediately:
- The NASA flight surgeons at the Baikonur launch site
must be provided w#h an Independent communications
capabBty allowing direct access to JSC.
- A NASA flight surgeon must be cleared to accompany the
Soyuz TM-21 U.S. crewmember from Baikonur to Moscow
in the event a medical evacuation is required.
- All NASA personnel working at the Baikonur Cosmodrome
must be Immunized against HepatUds B.
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The NASA flight surgeons should be supplemented with a
Registered Nurse/Emergency Medical Technician since
the flight surgeons will not be working in close proximity
to one another at the launch site.
Emerqency Medical Evacuation
There is no satisfactory medical evacuation (Medevac) plan available
through the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow is not
authorized to arrange for Medevac capability in the Republic of
Kazakhstan. A generic Medevac plan provides air evacuation
coordinated through the Second Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron,
Ramstein, Germany (AES). AES, in turn, can dispatch the 75th
Aeromedical Flight Squadron, Ramstein, Germany, who, with a
complement of Flight Surgeons, etc., carry out the Medevac mission.
It is estimated that it would take 9 - 12 hours for this resource to reach
Chkalovsky Air Base, Star City. This would not coordinate effectively
with the 3.5 hour transit from Baikonur to Star City. Commercial
Medevac capability is also available to Helsinki, Finland or London,
England which would require 4 - 6 hours to reach Chkalovsky Air
Base, Star City.
A Walking Blood Donor Program is being set up at the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow; however, the program is not currently in operation. A
modem medical facility with adequate blood bank facilities is available
at the Moscow Clinic (Michurinsky Hospital and Kunpsevo Hospital).
The Russian emergency medical system is the only logical resource
available at the launch site and the Russian plan for retrieval and
transport to Moscow the only plan in place. The official transfer of
care for our crewmember should occur at Star City and a protocol for
that transfer is not yet in place. Waiting on the tarmac at Star City for
the plane from Ramstein could represent a discontinuity of medical
services. The Russian plan calls for transfer from Star City to the
Rehabilitation Hospital in Moscow.
RECOMMENDATION
3.3.4.2 Prior to the Soyuz TM-21 launch, NASA must invesl_gate the
clinical resources avaUable for treatment of the U.S. member
of the crew as web as the practical options for transferring
care of the crewmember to U.S. care at the Chkalovsky Air
Base, including medical evacuation to the U.S. Air Force
Base at Ramstein, Germany.
Fourth Report: Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions 27
Soyuz TM-21/Mir 18 Main Expedition
The medical monitoring of inflight activities is the responsibility of the
Russians; however, the NASA flight surgeons will have real-time input
to all medical decisions pertaining to the U.S. astronauts health. In
addition, the Houston medical establishment will also have daily
briefings to include Mir Station environmental parameters, radiation
dosimetry, crew work/rest cycles, and information about crew health.
All potentially hazardous inflight medical procedures (e.g., CHIBIS
Lower Body Negative Pressure suit) will be monitored by the ground
(MCC-M) in real time. Routine medical communications can be
arranged on a weekly basis, and will be held as confidential. Because
of possible interruptions and delays in service on the Russian
telephone system, dedicated communication links must be provided for
the medical network.
RECOMMENDATION
3.3.4.3 Medical communicaUons between IBMP and NASA JSC
should be by dedicated service available throughout the
Phase 1A missions.
Deorbit
The astronauts and cosmonauts will be the medical responsibility of
the NASA flight surgeons at JSC.
Postflight
Two teams of three medical specialists, representing the U.$. and
Russia, will conduct the post flight examination and rehabilitation.
Although a post flight activity plan has been signed, the exact details
are still under negotiation. Existing NASA and IBMP postflight
protocols are incompatible.
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OBSERVATIONS - OPERATIONS RULES FOR MAKING MEDICAL
AND LIFE SUPPORT DECISIONS
The staff of the IBMP assured the Review Team that rules for making
near real-time medical and life support decisions exist; however, they
were not available for our review. It is believed that these decisions
are made on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. One can surmise that
their procedures are adequate based on the extensive experience of
their ground based support system and their documented successes
over thirty years of operational experience. The NASA flight surgeons
and the Joint Medical Policy Board will be included in all such
decisions. The NASA flight surgeons located at MCC-M will be in
contact with MCC-H as well as IBMP for assistance.
OBSERVATIONS - CONFLICT RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL ISSUES
AND THE JOINT MEDICAL SUPPORT PLAN
In the event of a conflict of opinion, the Joint Medical Policy Board,
augmented by key personnel from the MCC-M, will arbitrate and affect
a solution. The Joint Medical Support Plan, however, has not yet
been signed although multiple iterations have been submitted to IBMP
for review. At an operational level the NASA flight surgeons should
not be hampered by the lack of such a document. However, for
ongoing conflict resolution and mutual programs this plan is absolutely
essential and should be completed at the earliest possible date.
RECOMMENDATION
3.3.4.4 The Joint Medical Support Plan should be agreed upon and
Implemented promptly to avoid potential conflicts during the
course of 1he mission_
TRAINING OF NASA FLIGHT SURGEONS IN MCC-M
A schedule of training events exists and training has begun. Review
of the curriculum reveals the training to be quite comprehensive. The
major existing problem is how the NASA flight surgeons will schedule
their time during the Soyuz TM-21 and the Mir 18 Main Expedition.
This could be a significant problem if they also have clinical
responsibilities for a subsequent U.S. crew resident in Russia. The
availability of NASA flight surgeon time is a critical resource and
although it need not be redundant it must be sufficient.
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4 SOYUZ TM-21, MIR 18 MAIN EXPEDITION, AND STS-71
4.1 Soyuz TM-21
4.1.1 Status of Baikonur
OBSERVATIONS
The Baikonur Cosmodrome is located at 45.6°N/63.4°E in what is now
the Kazakh Republic. It has been a major missile and rocket launch
site and test facility since 1955 and has been used for all human
space flights since Yud Gagadn's flight in 1961. To the south of the
Cosmodrome is the city of Leninsk (population approximately 40,000)
which developed as the administrative center for Baikonur and
provides living quarters and other facilities for the staff at Baikonur.
While much debated, the condition of the Baikonur Cosmodrome
continues to support launch operations at a high level. Proton, Soyuz,
and other launch vehicles and their payloads are assembled, tested,
fueled, and launched to support civil and defense needs, in 1994, a
total of 30 launches (11 Soyuz, 13 Proton, 4 Zenit, 1 Tsiklon, and 1
Rokot) were made from Baikonur with no failures. On February 15,
1995, the Review Team witnessed the successful launch of a Soyuz
booster carrying Progress M-26, a Mir Station resupply mission. The
Review Team did not have an opportunity to view the Soyuz
processing facility, the Launch Control Center, or the launch pad.
Conditions in the support city of Leninsk continue to show signs of
duress with unsafe water supplies and general deterioration. While
needing much attention to reverse this trend, operations at Baikonur
have not yet been affected and there are no unique issues, without
workarounds, that could adversely impact the launch of Soyuz TM-21.
4.1.2 Soyuz Vehicle
OBSERVATIONS - SOYUZ BOOSTER
The A-2, or Soyuz, booster originally saw service in late 1963 with the
successful launch of Cosmos 22. This booster has been responsible
for over 1000 successful launches as of this report, more than the total
for all U.S. Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Shuttle launches combined. It has
been used for every manned Soviet and Russian launch. Table 5
below provides a summary of the reliability of this launch system.
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Last 20 Flights
Last 5 Years
Last 10 Years
Total since 1963
Table 2.
I O0%
(20/20)
100%
(133/133)
100%
(339/339)
93.1%
(1008/1083)
Soyuz Booster Reliability TM
Fueled with kerosene and liquid oxygen, the booster engines can be
started and throttled to 100% prior to committing to flight. No
crewmember fatalities have been caused by the booster. Two major
incidents have occurred involving manned Soyuz launches. The first
occurred in April 1975 and involved an improper stage separation.
This resulted in a suborbital flight in which the crew landed safely.
The second incident, in September 1983, involved a pad fire which
demonstrated successful use of the Soyuz Launch Escape System
(discussed below).
OBSERVATIONS - SOYUZ SPACECRAFT
The Soyuz TM spacecraft used in Phase 1A consists of three main
modules: the orbital module, the service module, and the descent or
entry module. The spacecraft is equipped with an automatic docking
system, but the docking maneuver may be flown manually by the crew
on-board Soyuz. The original Soyuz spacecraft was designed for the
moon missions in 1966. Plans for conversion into a space station
transport were drawn up in 1970. The Progress resupply spacecraft is
a modification of the basic Soyuz design. Since 1977, the sole
function of the Soyuz and its derivatives linked with the manned space
program has been to support manned space stations. Soyuz-TM is a
fourth generation design of the basic vehicle. Incorporation of the new
Kurs ("course') approach to docking system is the primary difference
between the Soyuz-TM and its predecessor the Soyuz-T. Many
18 Aviation Week and _pace TechnoloQv, February 20, 1995, p. 44.
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Soyuz-TM modifications were applied to Progress-M, the most recent
Soyuz derivative.
The first time a Soyuz flew in space was the unmanned Kosmos 133
mission (November 28-30, 1966). The first manned flight of Soyuz
(April 23-24, 1967) ended in tragedy. After what appears to have
been a trouble plagued flight, cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov was killed
when the shrouds of the primary parachute became tangled causing
the spacecraft to impact at a high velocity. In June 1971, following a
successful series of Soyuz missions, another Soyuz mission ended
tragically:
The Soyuz 11 crew perished dudng reentry when ... explosive bolts for
separating the orbital and service modules from the descent module
fired simultaneously, rather than sequentially as planned. The
abnormally violent separation jarred bose a 1-mm pressure
equalization seal in the descent module which was normally
pyrotechnically released at a lower alUtude. The atmosphere in the
descent module vented into space within 30 sec. The crew wore no
space suits, so they rapidly lost consdousnass end died.TM
Two years of spacecraft redesign and operational changes followed
the Soyuz 11 accident. Once again, crewmembers flew wearing
pressure suits.
Despite these setbacks, the basic Soyuz design went on to become
the workhorse of the Soviet/Russian human space flight program. It
has been in use for nearly 30 years and its flight total exceeds that of
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuffle combined.
The Soyuz TM spacecraft is equipped with a Launch Escape System
(LES) which employs a solid propellant tractor escape motor system
providing protection for the first 2% min. In an abort, pyrotechnics fire
below the Descent Module and halfway down the launcher shroud.
The LES then pulls the Descent Module/Orbital Module combination
free, still in the remaining upper shroud section. Peak acceleration is
about 14 g. The 12-nozzle motor fires for about 5 sec. and then four
shroud panels pivot outwards to slow the ascent. Smaller tower
motors fire to pull the shroud assembly clear for the now-separated
Descent Module to fall away. From the pad, the capsule would reach
an altitude of 1 km. and land some 2% km. away, using the 27 m.
10 Portree, pp. 6-7.
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diameter reserve parachute because of its more rapid deployment. =°
All six solid propellant braking rockets are used at 0.8 meters altitude
to cushion the landing.
The system has seen operational use. On September 26, 1983, the
LES was activated via backup radio command to allow cosmonauts
Vladimir Titov and Gennadi Strekalov to escape a major fire which
consumed the booster and launch pad.
In addition to the hardwired connection from the launch control center,
two redundant, independent radio command links are available to
activate the LES in the event of launch pad abort.
Operations Principles
OBSERVATIONS - ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Russians are responsible for the prelaunch, launch and docking of
Soyuz TM 21 to the Mir Station. They also are responsible for the
preparations and execution necessary for the safety of the crew
throughout these phases.
The NASA center for operations and medical consultation will be the
Science Management Area (SMA) in Building 35 at JSC. NASA
technical personnel also will be located at the Baikonur launch side
and in MCC-M.
OBSERVATIONS - MISSION MANAGEMENT, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND METHODS
The prelaunch and launch phases are controlled in accordance with
the standard Russian approach for Soyuz launches. The rendezvous
trajectory profile of the Soyuz with the Mir Station follows a path of
phasing and intercept maneuvers similar to the NASA profile. The
targeting for the maneuvers is computed in MCC-M and uplinked to
the Soyuz. The rendezvous is planned so that maneuvers and
braking are during Acquisition of Signal (AOS) which allows MCC-M to
monitor the Soyuz directly. Station keeping and docking are nominally
performed by the automatic control system, although the Commander
=o Janes Space Book, Tenth Edition (1994 - 1995), p. 28.
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of the Mir Station can take over and complete or abort the docking
manually.
Operations and coordination between the two sides will be conducted
between MCC-M and the SMA at JSC.
NASA will provide technical personnel in MCC-M, primarily with the
role of aiding in mutual understanding. NASA also will provide
medical personnel in MCC-M and medical personnel at Baikonur.
OPERATIONS - NASA MEDICAL OPERATIONS
Prefliqht Medical Facilities and Access to Crew
The NASA flight surgeons office space is adequate. The pharmacy is
well stocked and organized. Emergency packs have been assembled
and are quite adequate for emergency medical assistance. The two
NASA flight surgeons at Star City are held in the highest regard by
Russians and Americans alike. They are professional and competent
physicians who are doing an excellent job. There is no reservation
about their preparedness to provide any level of emergency care.
Medical Facilities and Personnel at Baikonur
NASA is not staffing independent medical facilities at Baikonur.
Operational Prefliqht Medical Protocol
No preflight medication or water restriction regime is scheduled. A
program of controlled access is utilized analogous to NASA's Health
Stabilization Program. A brief physical examination is given five days
prior to launch which includes finger stick blood work,
electrocardiogram, andurinalysis. NASA flight surgeons will be
involved with all phases of this protocol.
4.1.4 Rendezvous and Docking
OBSERVATIONS
Successful rendezvous and docking are critical to mission success.
Failed automatic docking attempts in September 1994 of Progress M-
24 and October 1994 of Soyuz TM-20 highlighted the dependence of
long duration space missions on logistics and crew exchange as well
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as the value of having manual and remote, teleoperated modes for
backup. In response to questions regarding the causes and
corrections to the automatic docking system anomalies, Review Team
members were told in January that an algorithm (i.e., software) change
had been made to accommodate a center of gravity location (moments
of inertia) outside the original defined limits. During the February site
visits, the Review Team members where informed that two additional
high-gain antennas were added to the "Kurs" system to correct
problems in roll.
Additional testing of the automatic docking system in November 1994
and January 1995 as well as the successful automatic docking of
Progress M-26 on February 17, 1995, increased the Review Team's
confidence in the automatic docking mode for the Soyuz TM-21
rendezvous and docking. Additionally, the Soyuz TM-21 crew are
trained in manual docking for the Soyuz as well as remote,
teleoperated docking from the Mir Station for the Progress.
Teleoperated docking of Progress was demonstrated in September
1994 on Progress M-24. Similar backup capability has been
incorporated into the Spektr and Priroda modules.
Main Expedition
Mir Station
OBSERVATIONS
Like the Soyuz booster and Soyuz spacecraft, the Mir Station is the
product of decades of evolution. The first Soviet space station, Salyut
1, was launched on April 19, 1971. Salyut 1 - 5 (April 1971 - August
1977) comprised the first generation, Salyut 6 and 7 (September 1977
- June 1986) the second, and the Mir Station (February 1986 -
present) is considered the first station of the third generation. The
dividing line between generations is not appearance as much as it is
"capability and robustness ''=1.
21 A Russian Space Station: The Mir Complex, JSC Mission Operations Directorate,
February 10, 1994, p. 1-1.
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The Mir base block was launched on February 19, 1986. Between
March 1987 and June 1990, three additional modules were added to
the Mir base block. These modules are as follows:
• Kvant 1 (launched March 31, 1987): Astrophysics module
• Kvant 2 (launched November 26, 1989): Mir extension
module and EVA airlock
• Krystal (launched May 31, 1990): Materials processing
laboratory with four furnaces and androgenous docking port
(to be used for Shuffie-Mir docking)
During its first nine years, the Mir Station has been manned by a total
of 51 crewmembers including 11 foreign cosmonauts.
During the course of Phase 1, two additional modules will be added to
the Mir Station. These modules and their scheduled launch dates are
as follows:
• Spektr (scheduled launch date - May 10, 1995): Adds four
additional solar arrays to Mir Station; remote sensing and
equipment for a wide variety of U.S. flight experiments - 755
kg. of U.S. science hardware
• Priroda (scheduled launch date - November 10, 1995):
Primarily Earth sensing and microgravity; over 1000 kg. of
U.S. science hardware
4.2.2 Systems
OBSERVATIONS - CURRENT MIR STATION SYSTEM
REDUNDANCY
A formal safety hazard analysis has been conducted by the U.S. and
Russia for the approach, 'docking, and docked phase of the STS-71
mission. Included in that analysis was Mir Station system redundancy
which confirmed that all Mir Station life critical systems are triple
redundant.
RSC Energia reported that all systems are at full redundancy and that
redundancy can be restored when necessary with. spare parts either
already on the Mir Station or in stock on the ground. Additionally, a
report on current Mir Station safety and reliability is provided quarterly
to NASA. Procedures are in place for hardware replacement either as
part of the preventative maintenance program or in response to
failures. Each year, TsNIIMASH recerUfies each system for the
following year. This is facilitated by the fact that RSC Energia has a
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full-scale integrated test version of the Mir Station, complete with flight
length cables, in its plant. The JSC Mir Extension Assessment Team
is currently assessing hardware requirements to support all Phase 1
activity.
The most complex systems on board are the computer system and the
attitude control system including gyrodynes. High moisture content on
previous Salyut Space Stations (particularly Salyut 6) led to
development of procedures to ensure thermal and humidity control for
Mir Station. These are carefully monitored. A recent analysis of
cables returned from orbit show no evidence of corrosion.
Hardware on the outside of the Mir Station is addressed differently.
Numerous EVAs have been used to affect repairs and maintenance.
Although certain systems cannot be repaired or replaced (e.g.,
propulsion system, thermal control system, etc.), these have been built
with a significant safety margin. For hardware which cannot be
replaced, additional redundancy is used in place of repair. Examples
include:
• Manifold in the propulsion system -- increased redundancy
using a second system which has already been tested.
• Pipelines - double redundancy.
• Failure of Thermal Control System - fallback procedures are
in place in the event that both systems fail; heaters are an
effective technique to counter the situation.
On October 11, 1994 the Mir Station suffered e nearly total loss of
electrical power. Several factors contributed to this situation. In
summary, the power loss anomaly appears to have been caused by a
combination of an aging system with small margins, an abnormally
high power demand caused by a large number of crewmembers on-
board, a reliance on the ground for systems management coupled with
a lack of communications coverage, and several procedural errors.
This incident emphasized the need to maintain adequate
communications.
In May 1995, Spektr will add four solar panels to Mir Station's current
complement plus additional batteries. As part of this process, two
arrays on Kristall must be retracted, moved to the Kvant module, and
re-extended. If the arrays cannot be retracted and re-extended they
will be discarded. Kristall solar arrays have redundant electrically
driven motors for extension and retraction, but no additional manual
mechanical mode is provided. Only one array is necessary to carry
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out a reduced science program. Power loss caused by failures in the
redeployment of both solar arrays and the inability of Spektr to dock
will force reduction of Mir Station operations to orbit maintenance.
The Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) loads
can not be supported and temporary departure of the crew could
become necessary.
OBSERVATIONS - SYSTEM MARGINS
System operating performance margins are established where
appropriate (e.g., propellant quantity redlines, power consumption,
battery state of charge). Activities that exceed the nominal planned
levels can be authorized by the flight control team as long as the pre-
mission margins are not compromised. To intentionally violate these
margins, permission must be obtained from the spacecraft designers.
OBSERVATIONS - ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE
SUPPORT SYSTEMS (ECLSS)
Atmosphere
The spacecraft environment is believed to be safe although occasional
spikes of contaminants above limits have been observed. Cosmonaut
debriefings with previously flown Mir Station cosmonauts reveal no
subjective problems with the atmosphere. Samplings of the Mir
Station atmosphere are being collected and will be analyzed after the
return of the Mir 17 Main Expedition crew on March 22, 1995.
Potable H_O
The potable water supply has been acceptable and drinking from it
has not resulted in significant medical sequelae. A detailed evaluation
of the environmental control system can be found in the "Technical
Assessment of Mir 1 Life Support Hardware for the International
Space Stations" by Kenneth L. Mitchell, et al.
Environment
Real-time, on-board radiation monitoring is available although the
exact equipment was not discussed. The expected absorbed dose is
calculated between 2.7 and 4.5 REM. The acoustic environment
ranges from 60-62 db in the rest areas and 67-72 db in the work
spaces. These are within acceptable limits for a 90-day mission.
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4.2.3 Experiments
OBSERVATIONS - SCHEDULED EXPERIMENTS AND
EXPECTATIONS
A complement of scientific experiments were proposed for the Mir 18
Main Expedition to afford an early opportunity to conduct long duration
(three months) life sciences investigations and microgravity
environment characterization of the Mir Station. Several reviews of
experiments were performed as a result of peer scientific review and
safety concerns. Final baselining of the experiments did not occur
until Feb 8, 1995, or five weeks before launch. The Review Team
was advised that of 34 planned experiments, only 28 are now
scheduled to be flown.
Preparation of the on-board experimental hardware fell behind
schedule due to a combination of circumstances. Delays in shipment
to Russia and delays in Russian customs resulted in late flight and
training hardware deliveries. In addition, the experiment procedures
delivered for translation from English to Russian were produced in
formats inappropriate for flight use and the translated procedures were
late in delivery. The late delivery of the equipment and procedures
resulted in a compressed training schedule which has placed the U.S.
astronaut at risk of not being able to satisfactorily conduct some
experiments. This is compounded by the lack of configuration control
for equipment stored on-board (see Stowage Inventory below).
In addition to the reduction in the number of experiments, it must be
noted that the aging Mir Station requires considerable on-orbit repair,
thereby potentially reducing crew time available for science. The
assistance of a cosmonaut is necessary to the success of numerous
flight experiments which are considered time critical. Although the
cosmonauts have agreed to assist in these experiments, Mir Station
maintenance priorities may preclude their availability. If the assistance
of a cosmonaut is not available, the experiments which require that
assistance should be rescheduled.
Another factor which needs to be considered is the scheduled late
arrival of life science experimental hardware contained within the
Spektr module. The majority of the experimental hardware is to be
launched on Speldr which will not dock until late in the Mir 18 Main
Expedition timeline. When one considers the time from launch to
docking (7-10 days), Spektr activation time (three weeks), and pre-
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deorbit time requirements for the U.S. astronaut, the useful time for
many of the inflight life science experiments on this first mission will
be minimal.
It seems inevitable that the combination of these factors will result in a
minimal inflight science yield for the Mir 18 Main Expedition. As a
result, the emphasis on this first joint mission must be on the
acquisition of operational experience with the Soyuz, Mir Station, the
Mir Station environment, MCC-M and crew activities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
4.2.3.1 NASA must tabor expectaUons for science during the Mir 18
Main ExpedlBon due to the lets arrival of experiment
hardware and flight procedures. Emphasis in the science
area should focus solely on astronaut Thagard's efforts to
characterize the Mir Station environment and provide
valuable lessons on how to best achieve U.S. scientific goals
aboard the Mir Station. The successful completion of speci_
expedments should be viewed within this context rather than
as a separate measure of success.
4.2.3.2 If the assistance of a cosmonaut is not available during Mir
18 Main Expedition to conduct time critical experiments, the
experlmente which require that assistance should be
rescheduled.
4.2.3.3 It is Imperative that flight and training hardware for U.S.
expedments as well as flight procedures be avaiklble in
Russia in accordance with a jointly agreed upon schedule.
the event that the necessary Items are not available within
that schedule, the experiment should be postponed or
cancelled.
In
OBSERVATIONS - STOWAGE INVENTORY
Debriefings with previous Mir Station crewrnembers have highlighted
the lack of a prearranged set of stowage locations for experiment
equipment. Additionally, no inventory list is maintained. In
combination, these issues make performing time critical science
experiments difficult. Review Team members were advised that the
team of experimenters will attempt to help the crew in maintaining a
stowage location inventory for science experiments.
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OBSERVATIONS - INVASIVE PROCEDURES
Only two experiments are invasive. The first involves a peripheral
venous catheter used to measure central venous pressure. The U.S.
astronaut and one Russian cosmonaut are trained in this procedure.
The second involves an infusion of calcium chloride to be performed
on Atlantis prior to the STS-71 deorbit.
RECOMMENDATION
4.2.3.4 The remaining Invasive protocol for Mir 18 Main Expedition
crewrnembers, the calcium-chloride Infusion scheduled to
occur aboard the Shuttle during STS-71, should be carefully
reviewed by medical operations before Implementation.
OBSERVATIONS - INSTITUTIONAL AUTOMATED DATA
PROCESSING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS (ADP/'I")
Although the initial requirements definition began in 1993, the NASA
institutional ADP/T infrastructure (e.g., telephones, facsimile machines,
voice teleconferencing systems, computer equipment, etc.) in Russia
is still rudimentary. Implementation plans have been developed;
however, actual installation has been delayed for a variety of reasons.
This schedule slippage has had a significant impact on mission
preparation as well as other aspects of day-to-day operations.
RECOMMENDATION
4.2.3.5 Implementation of NASA ins_uUonal automated data
processing and telecommunications (ADPrr) capabiliUes in
Russia must be given a high priority.
Mir Station Assured Crew Retum Vehicle (ACRV) - Soyuz
Whenever crews are aboard the Mir Station, a Soyuz spacecraft is
docked and ready for immediate crew ingress. In the event of a cabin
loss of pressure or any life threatening condition on-board the Mir
Station, the crew can retreat to the docked Soyuz, depart the station,
and initiate the return to earth sequence. The Soyuz-TM spacecraft
has a docked-to-station endurance of at least 180 days. A visiting or
replacement crew will dock at an alternate docking port in a fresh
Soyuz. The returning crew will use the aging spacecraft, leaving the
fresh one for the resident crew. A variation of this procedure had an
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unmanned Soyuz sent to the station to replace the resident crew's
aging spacecraft. This was done only once when Soyuz 34 replaced
Soyuz 32.
Operations Principles
OBSERVATIONS - ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Russians are responsible for the conduct of the Mir 18 Main
Expedition. They are also responsible for the safety of the crew
aboard the Mir Station throughout this phase.
The NASA center for operations and medical consultation will be the
Science Management Area (SMA) in Building 35 at JSC. NASA
technical personnel will be located at MCC-M.
OBSERVATIONS - MISSION MANAGEMENT, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND METHODS
The long duration aspect of the mission has a pronounced effect on
the approach to planning crew and MCC-M activities. There is no
pressure to detail activities for the entire mission. Four MCC-M teams
rotate shifts of 24 hours duration. Their role while on duty is to
monitor and support during the crew activity period, and during the
crew rest period to plan the activities for their next shift (four days
hence). The spacecraft systems expert support is available for
consultation during the crew active periods and could be summoned at
other times if necessary.
The flight plan uplinked to the crew at the beginning of their work day
is a general listing of planned activities for the next duty period of the
current MCC-M team. The crew is expected to be knowledgeable of
the procedures and detail sequence of events or to get them from on-
board documentation. The MCC-M schedules routine maintenance
events for the crew to perform. Repairs and replacement of failed or
depleted components is performed at crew initiative. Crew rehearsals
of emergency procedures are conducted periodically.
The crew work day is maintained on Moscow time. Because of orbital
precession, crew activities often occur outside of coverage by the
Russian ground stations for several hours at a time. This places a
high importance on the use of the two Luch communications relay
satellites for contingency operations. Our understanding is that these
42 Fourth Report: Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions
satellites are not fully utilized and only are scheduled for selected
periods of activities. Statements made to the Review Team indicate
that these satellites can be scheduled with a one-day lead time
required. In a highly critical emergency, satellite communications can
be obtained in approximately 6 hours.
Operations coordination between the two sites will be conducted
between MCC-M and the SMA at JSC. It was stated that there will be
a daily scheduled teleconference to assess the progress and status of
the mission. NASA will provide technical personnel at MCC-M
primarily with the role of aiding in mutual understanding.
OBSERVATIONS - MEDICAL OPERATIONS
Medical Communications
Weekly medical communications are scheduled, and the confidentiality
of these conversations will be observed. Both audio and visual modes
are available. As stated above, emergency communications can be
established through satellite links; however, required lead time can be
up to six hours.
Physioloqical Countermeasures
The obligatory countermeasure protocols include the use of treadmills,
veloergometer (bicycle ergometer), expanders (bungie exercise cords),
THK-Y1 and Pinguin suit for skeletal loading, Karl(as suit, (anti-G suit)
and CHIBIS (Lower Body Negative Pressure) suit. These are well
documented and the Russians have extensive experience in their
implementation. Eiectrostimulator and Braslet devices are optional.
Emerqency Medical Procedures and Medical Kits
All Russian crewman are trained in basic medical emergency
procedures and in the use of the on-board medical kits. Both Russian
and U.S. medical kits will be aboard Mir Station. The U.S. medical
kits were delivered to Mir Station via Progress M-26 on February 17,
1995.
4.3 STS-71
Prior to this report, the Task Force had already concentrated considerable
effort in reviewing preparations for STS-71 (see Task Force reports dated
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June 6, 1994, July 29, 1994, and November 2, 1994). The information in the
following sections is intended as an update to the material contained in the
previous reports.
4.3.1 Rendezvous and Docking
Preparations for rendezvous and docking of STS-71 to Mir Station are
considered adequate based on findings which include the following:
OBSERVATIONS - RCS PLUME AND DOCKING LOADS ANALYSIS
Extensive work has been done in analyzing both the RCS plume and
docking loads for the Shuttle-Mir docking scheduled to occur on STS-
71. Plume impingement data from the STS-64 Shuffle Plume
Impingement Flight Experiment compared favorably with the JSC
plume models. This, in addition to data obtained from a 250 run
matrix in the Shuffle Engineering Simulator consisting of approach and
docking runs, helped provide confidence to proceed with an approach
to within 10 meters (32.5 feet) of Mir Station during STS-63 on
February 17, 1995. Preliminary observations from the V-bar approach
of Discovery to Mir Station revealed no apparent disturbance of the
Mir Station during rendezvous, close approach to 10 meters, or 400
foot fly-around when utilizing the Iow-Z mode of the Shuffle Digital
Autopilot. Mir Station attitude maintenance during all phases was
within one arc-minute (0.017 degree) using its gyrodyne stabilization
system. R-bar approaches, which are planned for all subsequent
flights, normally require less RCS braking and should, therefore,
further reduce plume loads and contamination on the Mir Station.
Based upon the combination of analyses performed to date and
validated by flight tests on STS-64, STS-66, and STS-63, the Task
Force has no remaining concerns regarding plume loads on the Mir
Station solar arrays for the STS-71 rendezvous, proximity operations,
and docking maneuvers.
OBSERVATIONS - FLEXIBILITY OF APPROACH PROFILES
Although STS-63 flew a V-bar approach, an R-bar approach is
planned for STS-71 and subsequent Phase 1 docking missions. In
fact, because of an anticipated unique Mir Station solar panel
configuration for this flight, STS-71 will fly the approach to docking in a
90 degree nose out-of-plane attitude to minimize thruster plume
impingement. Although there are geometry and technique differences,
the difference in piloting task levels and associated training is minimal.
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OBSERVATIONS - JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND
RESPONSE
After orbit insertion of STS-63, two orbiter primary RCS thruster leaks
were discovered. The leak rate was sufficient to create a concern of
contamination to the entry attitude horizon scanner on the Soyuz
return vehicle. Attempts to stop the leaks were unsuccessful, so an
alternate procedure of closing and isolating the affected manifolds was
proposed. This stopped the thruster leaks, but also removed the
redundancy of the RCS system during the approach and proximity
operations. After careful consideration, it was determined that this
procedure was appropriate and, if necessary, the affected manifolds
could be reactivated. However, the concurrence of the appropriate
Russian management, based on trust and confidence in NASA's
systems knowledge and decision making process, was the key to
accomplishment of the important mission objective of closing to
approximately ten meters. This demonstration provides a strong
foundation for success of upcoming docking missions.
OBSERVATIONS - COMMUNICATIONS
In addition to the normal air to ground communications for both Orbiter
and Mir Station from their respective control centers, during STS-63
Orbiter to Mir Station communications was conducted via VHF radio
using a window mounted antenna. Range performance exceeded
mission requirements. Good communications was established at a
range in excess of 90 nautical miles. A consensus observation of
Review Team members at the MCC-H was that there appeared to be
an excess of non-essential communication traffic during the close
approach and proximity operations.
OBSERVATIONS - ORBITER ATTITUDE AND PROFILE CONTROL
Precise attitude, range and range rate control as demonstrated by the
crew of STS-63 appeared to verify the simulator modeling and training,
and analysis by JSC Engineering and Mission Operations Directorates.
At the closest approach range of 36 feet, attitude errors all three axes
appeared to be within the desired 2 degree limit. However, a two
degree angular fly-out maneuver was performed for task and
procedure demonstration.
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OBSERVATIONS - ALIGNMENT SENSOR
On STS-63, a color television camera (CTVC) which will be the
primary visual sensor for displacement and angular alignment during
docking, was mounted in the Spacehab and evaluated for Mir Station
target visibility and dosed circuit television monitor resolution during
STS-71 docking. Initial crew comments indicate target visibility and
resolution is usable for alignment and fly-out inside a range of 36 feet
using the unzoomed lens of the CTCV.
4.3.2 Mated Operations
OBSERVATIONS
Analysis to date performed by JSC Engineering indicates that Shuttle
using either primary or vernier RCS, or Mir Station using gyrodynes or
reaction control system jets is capable of controlling attitude of the
combined stack. On STS-71 during the 5 clays of mated operations,
attitude control of the mated stack will be accomplished 2 1/2 days by
the Orbiter Flight Control System (FCS) and 2 1/2 days by the Mir
Station Attitude Control System (ACS).
4.3.3 Separation
OBSERVATIONS - NORMAL (ODS) OPERATION
Normal separation of the Shuttle from the Mir Station is initiated by
retraction of the active hooks in the Androgenous Peripheral Docking
System (ODS) via electromechanical actuators. Although anomalies
were experienced during qualification testing, appropriate engineering
design changes were incorporated and thoroughly tested. Design
engineers and managers from both sides are completely satisfied that
all qualification testing anomalies have been resolved.
OBSERVATIONS - CONTINGENCY (PYROTECHNIC BOLTS)
SEPARATION
In the event the structural active hooks are not retracted with the dual
redundant electrical motors, a contingency separation capability exists
by firing pyrotechnic bolts in the hooks. Pyrotechnic certification for
reliability has proceeded without incident and the Review Team was
informed at RSC Energia that testing is scheduled to be completed by
the first week in April.
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4.3.4
OBSERVATIONS - EVA DEMATE CONTINGENCY
In the event of a failure of the orbiter docking system motor driven
latches, and then a subsequent failure in the pyrotechnic bolt release
system, an EVA will be used as the third means of separation of the
Shuttle from the Mir Station. EVA tools and procedures have been
developed and high-fidelity Weightless Environment Training Facility
(WETF) training began in late November 1994. Although the failure
scenarios requiring this procedure are extremely remote, there is a
high level of confidence that this EVA separation can be satisfactorily
accomplished.
Operations Principles
OBSERVATIONS - ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Russians are responsible for the continued conduct of the Mir 18
Main Expedition and the safety of the crew aboard the Mir Station.
NASA is responsible for the planning, training, and conduct of the
Shuttle phase of the mission - STS-71. NASA also is responsible for
the safety of the crew aboard the Shuttle throughout all of the Shuffle
phases of the mission.
OBSERVATIONS - MISSION MANAGEMENT, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND METHODS
The STS-71 mission is a joint mission with both MCC-H and MCC-M
having active roles and responsibilities per their normal mode of
operation. The joint activities requiring coordination and cooperative
actions are planned and controlled in a manner very similar to those of
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP). Detailed, specific mission rules for
the joint phase of operations are developed by the operations
organizations, and jointly approved by the technical director. Details of
the trajectory planning for rendezvous, station keeping, and docking
are prepared and jointly analyzed by both sides. The rules define
trajectory dispersion limits and systems configuration and performance
constraints for the joint phase of the mission. Also included are rules
regarding crew procedures for anomaly responses. Training and
simulations are conducted to verify the plans and applicability of the
mission rules.
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The Shuttle is the active vehicle throughout the rendezvous and
docking. The Mir Station remains in a prescribed attitude and makes
no translational maneuvers for the 48 hours preceding the Shuttle
launch through the completion of rendezvous. A joint "Go/No Go"
decision is required for initiating docking. The recent STS-63 flight in
February 1995 with the close approach to the Mir Station by the
Shuttle gives considerable confidence in this joint phase of the
mission.
Operations coordination between the two sides will be conducted
between the Mir Station and Shuttle crews and between MCC-M and
MCC-H.
NASA will provide technical personnel in MCC-M, primarily in the role
of support and clarification. Russia will provide technical personnel in
at MCC-H in the same role.
NASA also will maintain medical personnel at MCC-M and Russia will
have medical personnel MCC-H to coordinate in inflight and post-flight
medical matters relevant to the returning cosmonauts.
OBSERVATIONS - TRAINING
Standard STS mission training for a rendezvous mission has been
augmented with Russian language lessons and joint U.S.-Russian
integrated training simulations. Previous experience on STS-63 has
shown this to be representative of the Shuttle-Mir mission
environment. Both the flight crew and the mission control centers are
well qualified and prepared to conduct the STS-71 mission.
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Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford, USAF (Pet.)
Stafford, Burke and Hecker, Inc.
1006 Cameron Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Dear Gem. Stafford:
I am requesting that, in your role as Chair of the NASA Advisory
Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions,
you lead a team composed of several Task Force members and technical
advisors to Russia to review preparations and readiness for the upcoming
international Space Station Phase I missions. Given the outstanding work
the Task Force has produced to date, as well as your personal rapport with
members of the Russian Space Program, I believe that a team led by you
willprovide NASA with an additionallevel of confidence.
Iwould liketoreceiveyour reportpriortoMarch 1,1995.Please
acceptmy gratitudeforthe valuablework you and your team have already
done and for assisting NASA further in this critical effort. If I can be of any
assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely, _y
Daniel S:'.Goldin
Administrator
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* Participated in Preliminary Working Group site visits in Russia (January 1995)
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ACRONYM UST
Appendix 6
AAS
ACLS
ACRV
ACS
ADPFF
AES
AIT
AOS
APDS
AR&D
ASTP
ATLS
CIS
CG
CoFR
CMEV
CR
CTVC
DAP
db
DM
DTO
ECLSS
ET
EVA
FEL
GCTC
HHL
HST
IBMP
IMU
IPT
ISSA
IV&V
LBNP
Lidar
JSC
KSC
LES
LOS
Aeromedical Flight Squadron
Advanced Cardiac Life Support
Assured Crew Return Vehicle
Attitude Control System
Automated Data Processing and Telecommunications
Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron
Analysis Integration Team
Acquisition of Signal
Androgenous Peripheral Docking System
Automated Rendezvous and Docking
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
Advanced Trauma Life Support
Commonwealth of Independent States
Center of Gravity
Certificate of Flight Readiness
Command Message Encoder Verifier
Change Request
Color TeleVision Camera
Digital Autopilot
Decibel
Docking Module
Development Test Objective
Environmental Control and Life Support System
External Tank
Extra-Vehicular Activity
First Element Launch
Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center
Hand Held Lidar
Hubble Space Telescope
Institute for Biomedical Problems
Inertial Measurement Unit
Integrated Product Team
International Space Station Alpha
Independent Validation and Verification
Lower Body Negative Pressure
(L)ight (D)etection (a)nd (R)anging
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
John F. Kennedy Space Center
Launch Escape System
Loss of Signal
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MCC-H
MCC-M
MOA
MOD
MSFC
NASA
NIICHIMMASH
NIITP
NSTS
OAST-Flyer
ODS
OLMSA
OMDP
OSMA
OV
OV-103
OV-104
PCMMU
PFR
PGSC
PIO
PLB
PRCB
PRCS
Prox Ops
PSC
R-bar
RCS
REM
RMS
RNIEMT
ROCC
RPOP -
RSA
RSC-Energia
RTLS
TsNIIMASH
SAREX
SES
SLSD
SMA
ACRONYM UST (CONT1))
Mission Control Center- Houston
Mission Control Center- Moscow
Memorandum of Agreement
Mission Operations Directorate
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Institute of Chemical Machine Building
Scientific Institute of Thermal Processes
National Space Transportation System
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology - Flyer
Orbiter Docking System
Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
Orbiter Maintenance Down Period
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
Orbiting Vehicle
Discovery
Atlantis
Pulse Code Master Modulation Unit
Portable Foot Restraint
Payload and General Support Computer
Public Information Officer
Payload Bay
Program Review Control Board
Primary Reaction Control System
Proximity Operations
Payload Steering Committee
Radius Vector
Reaction Control System
Roentgen Equivalent in Man
Remote Manipulator System
Registered Nurse/Emergency Medical Technician
Range Operations Control Center
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program
Russian Space Agency
Rocket Space Corporation - Energia
Return to Launch Site
Central Scientific Research Institute for Machine Building
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment
Shuttle Engineering Simulator
Space and Life Sciences Division (JSC)
Science Management Area
Fourth Report: Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions 57
SPARTAN
SPAS
SPIFEX
SRB
SSP
SPO
SSPO
TCS
TRAD
V-bar
VHF
VRCS
WETF
WG-O
WG-1
WG -2
WG -3
WG-4
WG -5
WG-6
WG -7
WG-8
ACRONYM UST (CONT'D)
Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy
Shuttle Pallet Satellite
Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Program
Shuffle Program Office
Space Station Program Office
Trajectory Control Sensor
Tools for Rendezvous and Docking
Velocity Vector
Very High Frequency
Vernier Reaction Control System
Weightless Environment Training Facility
Joint Management Working Group
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Public Relations Working Group
Safety Assurance Working Group
Flight Operations and Systems Integration Working Group
Mission Science Working Group
Crew Training and Exchange Working Group
Mir Operations and Systems Integration Working Group
Extravehicular Activity Working Group
Medical Operations Working Group
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